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Abstract
In°ation, as a tax on money, gives buyers an incentive to reduce money balances. Sellers
are aware of this incentive and try to attract buyers by announcing price o®ers that reduce
the need for buyers to carry precautionary balances. We examine the e®ect of in°ation on
equilibrium price o®ers and associated trades in a competitive search environment where
buyers experience preference shocks after they are already matched with a seller. With
full information, the equilibrium price structure consist of a single °at fee applied equally
to all buyers. If buyer preferences are private information, incentive compatibility forces
sellers to charge more to buyers who purchase larger quantities. However, as in°ation rises,
price schedules become relatively °at. The equilibrium is e±cient at the Friedman rule
and in°ation reduces welfare both with full and private information. With full information,
in°ation reduces output for all buyer types. With private information, in°ation reallocates
output from buyers with a high desire to consume to buyers with a low desire to do so.
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11 Introduction
Many accounts stress that one of the major consequences of high in°ation is that individuals
end up buying goods even when they have little appetite for them while they are liquidity
constrained when they desire to make a large purchase. For example, Willy Derkow, who
was a student during the time of the German hyperin°ation, remembered in 1975:1 \As
soon as you caught one (bundle of notes) you made a dash for the nearest shop and bought
anything...You very often bought things you did not need." With lower in°ation, this e®ect
might not so easily noticeable to a casual observer, but it is potentially an important adverse
e®ect of in°ation. In this paper, we advance a model to capture this e®ect.
In our model, goods are traded in a competitive search environment. This environment
serves our purpose because it combines trade frictions with e±cient bilateral trades. The
existence of trade frictions is essential to capture the cost of in°ation mentioned above, which
implies that consumers end up with di®erent marginal rates of substitution. The e±ciency
of bilateral trades is a desirable modeling strategy because it avoids the ine±cient outcomes
we seek to model being the result of an inferior trade mechanism.2
In our model, buyers experience preference shocks not only after deciding the demand for
money but also after being matched with a seller. This timing is important for our results.
First, it gives people an incentive to carry precautionary balances to face the uncertainty
of expenditure needs. As people economize on precautionary balances to avoid the in°ation
tax, they face possible liquidity constraints. Second, each seller serves a potential clientele of
diverse buyers. Hence, it opens the possibility of cross-subsidies across di®erent buyer types,
so the provision of large quantity of goods to individuals with a low appetite for them is a
possible equilibrium outcome.
The main predictions of our model can be summarized as follows. In°ation gives buyers
an incentive to reduce money balances. Aware of this incentive, sellers attract buyers by
posting price o®ers that reduce the money balances that buyers need to carry. To this
1See www.johndclare.net/Weimar hyperin°ation.htm.
2As shown by Rocheateu and Wright (2005), competitive search achieves a ¯rst best outcome under the
Friedman role, while this is not the case with Nash bargaining or perfect competition. See Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) for a seminal contribution on the search theoretic foundations of money.
2end, the posted price o®ers must avoid the uncertainty of payments and hence reduce the
need to carry precautionary balances. With full information, the equilibrium price o®ers
consist of a °at fee which is independent of the quantity purchased by a buyer. As a
result, buyers optimally choose an amount of money equal to the °at fee, so they avoid
carrying precautionary balances. With private information of preference shocks, incentive
compatibility forces sellers to charge buyers a payment which is increasing with the quantity
purchased, so a °at fee is not an equilibrium outcome. However, as in°ation rises, price
schedules become relatively °at to reduce the uncertainty of payments. These °at price
schedules imply that buyers have an incentive to purchase relatively large amounts as long
as they are not liquidity constrained (have little appetite for goods). Meanwhile, when buyers
have a large appetite for goods, they face binding liquidity constraints. Therefore, in°ation
reallocates output from buyers with a high desire to consume to buyers with a low desire to
do so.
The idea that in°ation provides incentives to change trading arrangements in order to
avoid idle money balances is also found in two recent papers. In Faig and Huangfu (2004),
in°ation provides an incentive to market-makers to intermediate between buyers and sellers
with the objective of eliminating idle money balances. In Berentsen, Camera, and Waller
(2004) in°ation provides an incentive to banks to do a similar intermediation. In our model,
there is no intermediation between buyers and sellers from any third party. Moreover, the
idea that in°ation relocates output from the people with a high willingness to pay to people
less inclined to do so is not present in these papers.
The extension of competitive search to allow for the private information of preference
shocks follows our earlier work in Faig and Jerez (2004) (see also Shimer, 2004). This natural
extension is a novelty in monetary search models and, as stated above, it has important
economic implications.
In a companion paper (Faig and Jerez, 2005), we argue that the precautionary demand
for money explains not only the low velocity of circulation of money in the United States, but
also its interest elasticity. The model in that paper has a di®erent timing of shocks than the
present contribution. In that paper, the preference shocks are realized after the acquisition
of money but prior to matching. As a result, sellers are able to post price o®ers that target
3particular buyer types. In competitive search equilibrium, buyers are then separated in
di®erent submarkets according to their type, which eliminates the cross-subsidies emphasized
here.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3
describes the buyer-seller choice and the ¯nancial decisions. Sections 4 and 5 characterize
the competitive search equilibrium with full and private information, respectively. Section 6
concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Environment
The economy consists of a measure one of individuals. Individuals live in a large number of
symmetric villages.3 The members of each village are ex ante identical. They all produce a
perishable good speci¯c to the village and consume the goods produced in all villages except
for their own. Hence, individuals must trade outside their village to consume.
Time is a discrete, in¯nite sequence of days. Each morning an individual must choose
to be either a buyer or a seller in the goods market that convenes later in the day. Within
a village some individuals will be buyers and others will be sellers each day. However, over
time individuals will alternate between these two roles.




















is the one-period utility function and ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. The one-period
utility depends on the quantity consumed qb if the individual chooses to be a buyer, and on
the quantity produced qs if he chooses to be a seller. It also depends on an idiosyncratic
preference shock " which a®ects the utility of consumption "U(qb), but does not a®ect the
disutility of production C(qs). The preference shock is uniformly distributed in the interval
3This environment renders a tractable distribution of money holdings. See Faig (2004) for its relationship
with other devices proposed by Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005) to achieve a similar outcome.
4[1; ¹ "], independent across time, and drawn in such a way that the Law of Large Numbers
holds across individuals. The cumulative distribution function is then
F (") = '(" ¡ 1); (3)
where ' represents the constant density:
' =
1
¹ " ¡ 1
: (4)
Both U and C are continuously di®erentiable and increasing. Also, U is strictly concave and
C is convex, with U(0) = C(0) = 0; and U0(0) = 1: Finally, there is a maximum quantity
qmax that the individual can produce each day which satis¯es ¹ "U(qmax) · C(qmax).
Money is an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible, and storable asset. Units of money
are called dollars. The supply of money grows at a constant factor ° > ¯; so
M+1 = °M; (5)
where M is the quantity of money per individual.4 Each day new money is injected via
a lump-sum transfer ¿ common to all individuals. For money to grow at the rate °, this
transfer must satisfy:
¿ = (° ¡ 1)M: (6)
Each day goods are traded in a decentralized market where buyers and sellers from
di®erent villages meet bilaterally. In this market, buyers and sellers search for trading op-
portunities and the search process competitive (as in Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996)). Prior
to the trading process, each seller simultaneously posts an o®er, which is a contract detailing
the terms at which they commit to trade. Then buyers observe all the posted o®ers and
direct their search towards the sellers posting the most attractive o®er (possibly randomizing
over o®ers for which they are indi®erent). The set of sellers posting the same o®er and the set
of buyers directing their search towards them form a submarket. In each submarket buyers
and sellers from di®erent villages meet randomly. We assume that individuals experience
4For simplicity, the subscript t is omitted in most expressions of the paper, so, for example, M stands for
Mt and M+1 stands for Mt+1:
5one match and the short-side of the market is always served.5 That is, the probability that
a buyer meets a seller in a submarket is
¼
b (®) = min(1;®); (7)
where ® is the ratio of sellers over buyers in that submarket. Similarly, the probability that
a seller meets a buyer is
¼





Finally, when a buyer and a seller meet in a submarket they trade according to the speci¯ed
o®er.
In the decentralized goods market individuals are anonymous and enforcement is limited.
This combined with the absence a double coincidence of wants (implied by the ex-ante choice
of trading roles) makes money essential (see Kocherlakota (1989)). However, inside a village
¯nancial contracts are enforceable. In particular, in each village there is a centralized credit
market where a one-period risk-free bond is traded. There is also a centralized insurance
market where individuals can insure against their idiosyncratic risks. As it will become
apparent, these two centralized markets exhaust the gains from trade inside a village.
The village structure we adopt in this paper allows for a coherent coexistence of money
and ¯nancial assets. Moreover, the ability of individuals to rebalance their portfolio in their
village renders a tractable distribution of money balances. As discussed in Faig (2004),
this role is intimately related to the roles played by large households in Shi (1997) and the
centralized markets for goods in Lagos and Wright (2005). We adopt the village structure
because it proves very useful to our goals.
A typical day proceeds as follows (see Table 1). In the morning, centralized ¯nancial
markets are open in each village. During this time, ¯nancial contracts from the previous
day are settled. The government hands out monetary transfers that increase the money
supply. Individuals decide whether to be buyers or sellers. They then adjust their holdings
of bonds and money, and purchase insurance if they wish. At noon ¯nancial markets close
and the goods market opens. The competitive search process starts and submarkets are
formed. When a buyer and a seller meet in a submarket, the buyer learns her valuation for
5As we shall show, this matching technology implies that in equilibrium ® = ¼b = ¼s = 1 in all submarkets.
6the seller's good (" is realized) and the agents trade according to the pre-speci¯ed o®er. As




Financial markets are open Goods market is open
Previous Choice Choice Sellers Buyers Realization Traders
¯nancial buyer-seller of bonds, post choose preference meet
claims money, o®ers among shock and
Settled insurance o®ers trade
Our equilibrium concept combines perfect competition in all centralized ¯nancial markets
with competitive search in the decentralized goods market. In equilibrium, individuals make
optimal choices in the environment where they live. This environment includes a sequence of
nominal interest rates and insurance premia, and a sequence of conditions in the goods market
to be detailed below (essentially the reservation surpluses of other traders). Individuals
have rational expectations about the future conditions of this environment. We focus on
symmetric and stationary equilibria where all individuals follow identical strategies and real
allocations are constant over time.
To characterize an equilibrium, we adopt the following strategy. First, we describe the
buyer-seller choice and the ¯nancial decisions of a representative individual given the equi-
librium nominal interest rates and insurance premia, as well as some conjectures about the
conditions in the afternoon goods market. Then, we characterize the conditions in the goods
market in a competitive search equilibrium. Finally, we show that these conditions satisfy
our former conjecture. A formal de¯nition of an equilibrium is given at the end of Section 4.
3 Buyer-Seller Choice and Financial Decisions
Consider an individual facing the following environment.





where ° is the growth factor of the money supply and ¯ is the subjective discount factor.
Since good prices are proportional to M; which grows at the factor °; the real interest rate
is then equal to the subjective discount rate: ¯¡1 ¡ 1:
In the insurance market, the equilibrium insurance premia are actuarially fair. An in-
dividual that decides to be a buyer can purchase an insurance contract which delivers ¹b
"
dollars next day contingent on experiencing a shock " in the afternoon. The fair premium ~ ¹b
of such a contract is ~ ¹b =
R "
1 ¹b
"dF("). Analogously, the seller can insure against the type of
buyer it meets in the goods market. In our environment, there is no need for insuring risks
on meeting a trader or not because such risks vanish in equilibrium (all individuals trade
with probability one).
We make the conjecture that the goods market has a unique active submarket in equi-
librium where all individuals trade. The ratio of buyers over sellers is ®. The terms of trade
are contingent of the buyer's valuation " (or type) and are given by fq";d"g"2[1;¹ "] where q" is
the quantity and d" is the total payment in dollars of a type{" buyer.6 Since the payments
d" change over time as the money supply grows, the terms of trade may also be described





Here z" are real payments in next day utils. In a stationary equilibrium the pairs (q";z") are
time invariant.
Prior to all ¯nancial choices, each morning the individual chooses the trading role that






















where A is the initial wealth in dollars, and V b and V s are the value functions conditional on
being a buyer or a seller during the day, respectively. The money supply is used to de°ate
6Since there is a large number of villages, each with a continuum of individuals, there is a large number
of buyers of each type " in a symmetric equilibrium.
8nominal quantities. This de°ator is appropriate because goods prices increase proportion-
ately with M (see (5) and (6)). The ratio A=M can be interpreted as initial real wealth and
is denoted by a.
While ¯nancial markets are open, the individual reallocates wealth and may also purchase
insurance. Conditional on being a buyer the individual chooses the demands for money, mb;





"2[1;¹ "] ; to solve:
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mb + bb (1 + i) + ¹b














b ¸ d" for all " 2 [1; ¹ "]: (16)
The buyer meets a seller with probability ¼b (®). The preference shock " is then realized and
the buyer purchases q" for d" dollars. In this event, next period's real wealth ab"
+1 is given
by (13). If the buyer does not meet a seller, she buys nothing and next period's real wealth
ab0
+1 is given by (14). The choice of how to allocate wealth between money mb and bonds bb
must satisfy the budget constraint (15). In addition, mb must satisfy (16) since the buyer
must carry enough money to face all contingent payments.
Conditional on being a seller the individual chooses the demands for money ms and bonds
bs to solve:
V




























ms + bs (1 + i) + ¹s














s ¸ 0: (21)
The seller meets a buyer with probability ¼s (®) and, contingent on the buyer's type, sells q"
for d" dollars. If the seller does not meet a buyer he sells nothing. Next period real wealth
in each event is given by (18) and (19). The budget constraint (20) must be satis¯ed and
money cannot be negative, (21).
In addition to all constraints speci¯ed above, the individual faces an endogenous lower
bound on next period real wealth because he or she must be able to repay the amounts
borrowed with probability one without reliance to unbounded borrowing (No-Ponzi game
condition):
a+1 ¸ amin with probability one. (22)
We denote as a+1 is the stochastic real wealth for next period, which depends on the choice
of being a buyer or a seller, the realization of "; and the trading match. The endogenous
lower bound amin is equal to minus the present discounted value of the maximum guaranteed
income the individual can obtain as a seller.
The optimization program described in equations (11) to (??) is easily solved once the
value function V is known. The value function V is a well de¯ned function of a that can be
characterized using standard recursive methods. Also, V is concave with a linear segment
as stated in the following proposition and proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: There is an interval [a;a] ½ [amin;1) where the equilibrium value
function V takes the linear form
V (a) = v0 + a: (23)
where v0 is a term independent of a. Outside this interval, V is strictly concave and contin-
uously di®erentiable. Finally, the interval [a;a] is absorbing, that is a 2 [a;a] implies a+1 2
[a;a] with probability one.
10The linear interval of V is due to the endogenous choice of the trading role individuals
make each day. Intuitively, if an individual is not rich enough to be a buyer forever and
not so poor to have to be a seller at perpetuity, then the individual will alternate between
being a buyer and a seller. As the individual does so, wealth does not a®ect the quantities
consumed or produced, instead it a®ects how often and how early the individual consumes
or produces. Since utility is linear on the times and the timing an individual consumes and
produces, the value function is linear.
The property that the interval [a;a] is absorbing simpli¯es the model dramatically. As-
suming that all individuals have initial wealth in the interval [a;a]; as we assume from now
on, the behavior of all buyers and all sellers is independent from their wealth. Therefore,
there is no incentive to create submarkets that cater to individuals of di®erent wealth and
the distributions of money holdings are easily characterized.
The optimal demands for money follow from the fact that money earns not interest but
bonds earn i > 0: This implies that it is not optimal to carry money balances that are never
used. Therefore, mb is equal to the highest contingent payment: mb = maxfd"g"2[1;¹ "] and
ms = 0: Using these optimal demands for money, (23), and a+1 2 [a;a] with probability one,
the value functions of the buyer (12) and the seller (17) simplify into:
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+ a and (24)
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These value functions di®er only in the ¯rst term. This term represents the expected trading












s (®")[z" ¡ C (q")]dF("): (27)
In (26), we de¯ne m to be the real money in next day utils: m ´ ¯mb=M+1: Since buyers
carry only enough money to make the highest contingent payment, we have
m ´ ¯m
b=M+1 = maxfz"g"2[1;¹ "] : (28)
11Note that the insurance coverages are missing from (26). As long as a 2 [a;a] the indi-
vidual is indi®erent between purchasing insurance or not. The only role played by insurance
markets is to ensure that wealth does not drift out of the interval [a;a]. This role is only
important if buyers purchase nothing for low realizations of ": If buyers purchase positive
amounts for all realizations of " then, in general, insurance markets are redundant. In this
case, the individual prevents a+1 from drifting below a by choosing to be a seller and prevents
it from drifting above a by choosing to be a buyer.
4 Competitive Search with Full Information
In this section we characterize a competitive search equilibrium in the goods market given the
morning ¯nancial decisions. We show that the conjecture in Section 3 is satis¯ed. Then we
characterize a symmetric monetary stationary equilibrium where all individuals have initial
wealth a 2 [a;a]:
When the goods market opens sellers post their o®ers. An o®er is a schedule f(q";z")g"2[1;¹ "],
by means of which a seller commits to sell q" units of output in exchange of a real payment
z" in the event of being matched with a buyer of type ".7 All individuals have rational
expectations regarding the number of buyers that will be attracted by each o®er, and thus
about the relative proportion of buyers and sellers that will trade in each submarket. In a
competitive search equilibrium the o®ers posted by the sellers must be such that sellers have
no incentives to post deviating o®ers.




that are formed in equilibrium. A
competitive search equilibrium is a set f­; ¹ Sb; ¹ Ssg such that
1. All buyers attain the same expected surplus ¹ Sb.
2. All sellers attain the same expected surplus ¹ Ss.
7We could allow for o®ers which are contingent both on the type " and the wealth a of the buyer. However,
from the sellers' view point all buyers of a given type " are identical even if their wealth is di®erent because
their expected surplus (26) and money balances (28) are independent of a. Hence, restricting to o®ers which
are only contingent on " is without loss of generality.
123. The expected surpluses of buyers and sellers are identical: ¹ Sb = ¹ Ss








b (®)["U (q") ¡ z"]
ª
dF(") ¡ im (29)
subject to




s (®)[z" ¡ C (q")]gdF(") = ¹ S
s, and (31)
Buyers ex ante identical and they are free to choose the submarket where they partici-
pate, so they must attain the same expected surplus. The same is true for sellers. Also, for
trade to occur in equilibrium there must be buyers and sellers present in that submarket,
so individuals must be indi®erent between the two trading roles. Optimal behavior and
competition by sellers lead to condition 4. This condition says that buyers choose among
submarkets in order to maximize their expected surplus subject to their cash constraint and
the constraint that sellers receive a ¯xed expected surplus ¹ Ss. Sellers never post deviating
o®ers that imply a lower expected surplus because they can attain ¹ Ss in the current sub-
market.8 If a seller tries to post an o®er that attracts buyers and yields a higher expected
surplus, other sellers would pro¯tably undercut this o®er (e.g. by o®ering those buyers the
same quantity for a slightly lower payment). The cash constraint (30) ensures that the buyer
is able to pay for the good for any realization of ".9
Program (29) to (30) implies that in equilibrium the total expected surplus from a match
must be maximal subject to the cash constraint. But then buyers and sellers must trade
with probability one in any active submarket:
® = ¼
b (®) = ¼
s (®) = 1: (32)
8Since individuals are in¯nitesimal in the market, they take as given the expected surplus of other indi-
viduals.
9We assume that seller's o®ers require buyers to pay for the good before " is realized. If buyers cannot
be forced to pay before they learn their type program (29) to (30) is further restricted by an individual
rationality constraint that buyers must be willing to make the corresponding payments after they know their
type.
13The sellers' expected surplus (31) depends on the buyer's average payment, but it does not
depend on higher moments of the distribution of fz"g"2[1;¹ "]. In contrast, for a given average
payment, a buyer prefers a smooth distribution of fz"g"2[1;¹ "] because the opportunity cost
of holding money depends on the maximum payment. Therefore, equilibrium payments are
uniform:
z" = m for " 2 [1; ¹ "]: (33)
Substituting (33) and (32) into (31) yields











["U (q") ¡ (1 + i)C (q")]dF(") ¡ (1 + i) ¹ S
s: (35)
The equilibrium quantities are then given by the ¯rst order condition of this program:
"U
0 (q") = (1 + i)C
0 (q") for " 2 [1; ¹ "]: (36)
To complete the characterization of a competitive search equilibrium, it remains is to







["U (q") + C (q")]dF("): (37)
We are ready to de¯ne an equilibrium of the monetary economy:




set of real functions f(q";z")g"2[1;¹ "] that satisfy the system of equations: (9), (33), (32), (34),
(36), and (37). This equilibrium is consistent with the environment conjectured in Section 3.
In particular, since the solution to program (29) to (30) is unique, there at most one active
submarket in equilibrium.
We have shown that optimal trading o®ers that minimize the opportunity cost of money
balances by having z" identical for all ": Buyers optimally choose an amount of money m
equal to the uniform payment and spend all their cash. The welfare e®ects of in°ation are
14captured by equations (36), (34) and (37), together with the equation that determines the
equilibrium nominal interest rate (9). At at the Friedman rule, i ! 0, the quantities of
output traded are e±cient. The convexity of C and concavity of U imply that q" is an
increasing function of "; so high types purchase more output than low types. As in°ation
rises the opportunity cost of holding money increases inducing buyers to reduce their money
holdings. Sellers adjust by reducing their fees. But buyers anyway respond by purchasing
lower quantities in all trading meetings and carrying too little money (so they face binding
liquidity constraints when faced with abnormally good trading opportunities). That is, q"
is a decreasing function of i for all ". These reductions of output relative to the e±cient
quantities represent the welfare cost of in°ation.
The properties of the demand for money and the welfare cost of in°ation are essentially
those of a standard cash-in-advance model. Higher nominal interest rates reduce both the
demand for money and the output traded for all buyer types because in (36) the cost of
goods in multiplied by the factor (1 + i) as in cash-in-advance models.
The equilibrium pricing structure is only implementable if preference shocks are observed
by the seller. has to undesirable properties. With a uniform payment higher types receive
more output and yet pay the same. Unless shocks are observed by the seller, buyers then
have an obvious incentive to lie and say they have the highest type ¹ ". In the next section,
we consider the case that preference shocks are private information.
5 Competitive Search with Private Information
In this section, we characterize a competitive search equilibrium when shocks are privately
observed by buyers. In this case, the o®ers posted by sellers must be incentive compatible.
That is, o®ers must give buyers an incentive to truthfully reveal their type.10 Program (29)
10If shocks are not observable in the village or origin insurance may not exists. This is irrelevant for the
characterization of an equilibrium as we de¯ne it because V is a±ne in the relevant segment. However, the
absence of insurance changes the values of a and a in (53) and so the set of parameter values for which an
equilibrium exists.
15to (31) is then further restricted to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint:11
"
0 2 arg max
"2[1;¹ "]
["
0U (q") ¡ z"], for all "
0 2 [1; ¹ "] (38)
As is standard, we restate the incentive compatibility constraint (38) using the following
well-known result (see Mas-Colell, Winston and Green, 1995, Proposition 23.D.2).
Let the indirect ex-post trade surplus of a type-" buyer be de¯ned as
v" ´ "U (q") ¡ z": (39)
A trading o®er satis¯es the incentive compatibility constraint (38) if and only if q" is non-
decreasing in " and v" satis¯es





[xU (qx) ¡ zx]dx =
Z "
1
U (qx)dx, for all " 2 [1; ¹ "]: (40)







v"dF(") ¡ im (41)
subject to Z ¹ "
1
["U (q") ¡ C (q") ¡ v"]dF(") = ¹ S
s; (42)
"U (q") ¡ v" · m for " 2 [1; ¹ "]; (43)
_ v" = U (q") for " 2 [1; ¹ "]; and (44)
q" is non-decreasing in ": (45)
11Formally, an o®er f(q";z")g"2[1;¹ "] is a direct revelation mechanism that is incentive compatible. We
could also allow for random direct revelation mechanisms. However, as shown by Maskin and Riley (1984),
random direct revelation mechanisms are only optimal if absolute risk aversion decreases with the buyers
type. In our environment absolute risk aversion is the same for all types, so random mechanisms are never
used in equilibrium. See, however, the competitive search labor model in Shimer (2004).
16The control of this problem is q" while v" is the state variable. The optimal solution is
characterized using the Maximum Principle (see the Appendix). The optimal path for the




(" ¡ °2)U0 (q") = °1C0 (q") for " 2 [1; ^ "]; and
q" = q^ " ´ ^ q for " 2 [^ "; ¹ "];
(46)

























Here represents break-point shock ^ " where the cash constraint becomes binding. Combining










The optimal path for the state variable v" is implied by the di®erential equation (44) for
a given initial value v1: The initial value v1 in equilibrium is determined by (42) together
with the condition for the coexistence of buyers and sellers in the market: ¹ Ss = ¹ Sb: The
optimal value of m is given by (43) with equality at the break-point ^ ". Finally, the underlying
payments fz"g"2[1;¹ "] are calculated from (39).
A monetary stationary equilibrium is a vector of real numbers
¡
i;°1;°2; ^ ";®;m; ¹ Ss; ¹ Sb¢
and a set of real functions f(q";v")g"2[1;¹ "] that satisfy the system of equations: (9), (32), (41),
(42), (43) with equality at ^ ", (44), (46), (47), (48), (50), and ¹ Ss = ¹ Sb.
The equilibrium is implemented if sellers post an increasing non-linear price schedule.
For buyers to choose the quantities of output consistent with (46), they must face a price
schedule that has the form:
Z (q) = °0 + °1C (q) + °2U (q); (51)
17where °0 is a constant. That is, buyers pay more for larger quantities. As in°ation rises, °1
falls and °2 increases. Therefore, the equilibrium price schedule becomes more °at. That is,
the o®ers posted by the sellers in equilibrium try to minimize the increase in the cost of idle
money balances.
In addition to the price schedule, trading o®ers must include some additional restrictions.
The reason is that in general a buyer facing (51) will not choose a quantity of money that is
consistent with the threshold ^ " in equation (50). Instead, the buyer would carry too much
money if ¹ " > (1 + 2i) ^ "; which occurs for high values of ¹ ": In this case, trading o®ers must
include a cap on output at ^ q. Conversely, the buyer would carry too little money if ^ " if
¹ " < (1 + 2i) ^ ", which occurs for low values of ¹ ". In this case, trading o®ers must include a
restriction on the minimum amount of money that buyers carry (the equilibrium m).
The equilibrium is e±cient at the Friedman Rule as in the full information model. That
is, as i ! 0 the cash constraint never binds: ^ " = ¹ ". Also, °1 = 1 and °2 = 0; so the
quantities traded are e±cient. Unlike in the case of full information, money circulates faster
as i rises not only because buyers reduce their money balances (^ " falls), but also because
they increase their purchases when they are not liquidity constraint. That is, an increase in
i reduces m and ^ q but increases q" for " 2 (1; ^ "). This can be shown by applying the Implicit
Function Theorem to the system of equations (46) to (48). This application implies that for





(1 + i)(1 + 2i)
U0 (q")
°1C00 (q") ¡ (" ¡ °2)U00 (q")
> 0: (52)
Consequently, in°ation not only curtails consumption due to lack of liquidity for those buyers
with high valuations (" > ^ "), but it also increases consumption for those buyers with a low
valuations (" < ^ "): These deviations from the e±cient output quantities represent the welfare
cost of in°ation. Equations (51) and (52) imply that z" is an increasing function of i since
z" = Z (q") for " < ^ ". Therefore, as i increases buyers spend a larger fraction of their money
balances when they are not liquidity constrained. The increase in the payments z" combined
with the reduction of real money balances m reduces the fraction of unspent money in the
economy.
186 Conclusion
We have provided a model, to capture the popular accounts that during high in°ation
episodes individuals end up buying goods they care little about while they are liquidity
constrained when they have a good trading opportunity. The key elements of our model
are the following: competitive search, preference shocks realized after matching, and private
information of these shocks. The intuition of our main result goes as follows. Since in°a-
tion represents a tax on money balances, sellers attract buyers by posting price o®ers that
reduce the money balances that buyers need to carry. To this end, the posted price o®ers
must avoid the uncertainty of payments. With private information of preference shocks, this
uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated because of incentive compatibility constraints.
However, as in°ation rises, price schedules become relatively °at. These °at price schedules
imply that buyers have an incentive to purchase relatively large amounts as long as they are
not liquidity constrained. Meanwhile, when buyers have a large appetite for goods, they face
binding liquidity constraints. Therefore, in°ation reallocates output from individuals with a
high desire to consume to individuals with a low desire to do so.
19Appendix
Proof Proposition 1
Consider the problem of an individual in the equilibrium of our basic model where all
other individuals have value functions (23). These other individuals have initial wealths in
the interval [a;a]: Throughout the appendix, we use without further proof the absence of
uncertainty in trading opportunities because of e±cient matching.
For all ¯nite a ¸ amin; the set of feasible time and state contingent policies is non empty.
The feasible values of the quantities consumed and produced are bounded. Also, for all
the feasible policies the present discounted utility is well de¯ned and ¯nite because U is a
continuous function. Consequently, we can use standard recursive methods to ¯nd the value
function.
In competitive search, we can recursively characterize the individual optimization prob-

















"2[1;¹ "] are the set of choices








"g"2[1;¹ "] is the trading o®er posted by the seller. These
choices are subject to the constraints (13)-(16), (18)-(21), and (??). Moreover, in the ¯-
nancial markets the individual takes as given the rate of interest and the insurance premia.
In the goods market, the individual takes as given the reservation expected trade surpluses
of other traders. Therefore, as a seller, the individual must make o®ers that gives buy-
ers the expected trade surplus they can attain in alternative submarkets: the posted o®ers
must be a subset of fqs
";zs






















dF(") ¸ ¹ Ss, because competition among sellers drives o®ers to be the best
possible for the buyers that provide sellers with the trade surplus ¹ Ss.
Let C(a) be the space of bonded and continuous functions f : [amin;1) ! R; with the sup
norm. Use the Bellman's equations (12) and (17) together with (11) to de¯ne the mapping
T of C(a) onto itself by substituting f for V in the right hand sides of (12) and (17) and
12This characterization uses a more general de¯nition of competitive search than the text because it allows
the individual to have wealth outside the interval [a;a]:
20denoting as Tf(a) the left hand side of (11). The choice variables and constraints of these
maximization programs are described in the previous paragraph. For a given a; the set of
feasible policies is non-empty, compact-valued, and continuous. The utility function U is a
bounded and continuous on the set of feasible policies, and 0 < ¯ < 1: Therefore, Theorem
4.6 in Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989) implies that there is a unique ¯xed point to
the mapping T, which is the value function V:
Let V(a) be the sup normed space of functions f : [amin;1) ! R that satisfy (23) for v0;






























where i; m; ¹ Ss; and z" satisfy the equilibrium system of equations described in 4. Consider
the mapping T de¯ned in the previous paragraph. Since V is concave, it is an optimal
policy to fully insure preference shocks (full insurance is strictly optimal if there is a positive
probability that a+1 = 2 [a;a]). In consequence, a+1 is not stochastic. Let ab
+1 be next period
real wealth for an optimal policy conditional on being a buyer. Similarly, let as
+1 be the
optimal policy for a seller. If ab
+1;as
+1 2 [a;a], TV (a) is the maximum of V b(a) and V s (a) in
equations (24) and (25), so TV (a) is a±ne and the trade surpluses are those in (26) and (27).
The optimal policies of the individual are the equilibrium ones modeled in the main text.
Therefore, the individual is indi®erent between being a buyer or a seller. This indi®erence is
broken when one policy would lead to a+1 = 2 [a;a]: In such a case, the strict concavity of V
outside the interval [a;a] implies that it is suboptimal to be a seller if as
+1 > a: Likewise, it
is suboptimal to be a buyer if ab
+1 < a: Consequently, the recursive budgets (13) to (15) and
(18) to (20), together with (53), imply that a+1 2 [a;a] if an only if a 2 [a;a]. This implies
that TV (a) is a±ne in the interval [a;a]: Equation (25) implies that the constant term of
this a±ne function is the value of v0 in (53). If a > a; the optimal policy is to be a buyer.
Vice versa, if a < a; an optimal policy is to be a seller. In both cases, the strict concavity of
U and convexity of C imply the strict concavity of TV (a) for a = 2 [a;a]. In summary, T maps
21V(a) onto itself. Therefore, the value function V satis¯es (23). Finally, since V is concave,
U is continuously di®erentiable, and the solution is interior, V is continuously di®erentiable.
Competitive Search Equilibrium with Private Information
In this section, we solve program (41) to (45) in two stages. Stage 1 (Statements 1 to
13) solves for the program for a given the Lagrange multiplier ¸ associated with constraint
(42), and given m and v1: Stage 2 (Statements 14 to 18) endogeneizes ¸; m; and v1:
1. Let ¸ > 1=2 and m > ¡v1:The terms of trade in a competitive search equilibrium






fv" + ¸["U (q") ¡ C (q") ¡ v"]gdF(") (54)
subject to
_ v" = U (q"); (55)
z" ´ "U (q") ¡ v" · m; (56)
q" ¸ 0, and (57)
v1 given. (58)
2. Program (54) to (58) is a standard optimal control problem with q" as the control
variable and v" as the state variable. A solution to the program exists because the set
of feasible paths is non-empty, bounded, and there exists a feasible path for which the
objective in (54) is ¯nite. For example, the path q" = 0 for all " and v" = v1 is feasible,
and with this path the objective in (54) is ¯nite.
3. Suppose there is an interval [a;b] µ [1; ¹ "] of values of " where the inequality constraint
(57) is binding, that is q" = 0 for " 2 [a;b]: Then (55), (56), and U(0) = 0 imply that
in this interval z" is constant and equal to ¡va · ¡v1. Since a · ¹ " and m > ¡v1;
constraint (56) is not binding in [a;b]: Therefore, constraints (56) and (57) never bind
simultaneously.
13The constraint q" must be a non-decreasing function of " is omitted for the time being because as it will
be seen it is not binding.
224. Suppose there is an interval [a;b] µ [1; ¹ "] of values of " where the inequality constraint
(56) is binding, that is z" = m for " 2 [a;b]: Then Statement 3 implies that in this
interval q" > 0; so U(q") > 0: Hence, (55) and (56) imply that q" is constant in the
interval [a;b].
5. Let $" denote the co-state variable associated with (55), and &" and #" be the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (56) and (57) respectively. The Hamiltonian of the program
(54) to (58) is:
H = v"' + ¸["U (q") ¡ C (q") ¡ v"]' + $"U (q") + &" [m ¡ "U (q") + v"] + #"q"): (59)
6. For the values of " such that (56) is not binding, the Hamiltonian (59) is strictly
concave with respect to q" (for these values &" = 0) and linear (and so concave) with
respect to v". For the values of " such that (56) is binding, q" is a constant (Statement
4). Therefore, the solution to the program (54) to (58) is unique, it is characterized by
the ¯rst order conditions that result from applying the Maximum Principle, and both
q" and v" are continuous functions of ":
7. The ¯rst order condition with respect to the control variable q" is (Hq" = 0):
(¸' ¡ &")"U
0 (q") + $"U
0 (q") = ¸'C
0 (q") ¡ #": (60)
The co-state variable must obey (Hv" = ¡ _ $"):
_ $" = (¸ ¡ 1)' ¡ &": (61)
Finally, the transversality condition implies14:
$¹ " = 0: (62)
Integrating (61) for an interval ["; ¹ "] and using (62), the value of the co-state variable
$" is solved to obtain:
$" = (¸ ¡ 1)'(" ¡ ¹ ") + §"; (63)
14The transversality condition is $¹ "v¹ " = 0: However, v¹ " > 0 if v1 > 0 given U(:) ¸ 0 and (55). If v1 = 0
still v¹ " > 0. If v¹ " = 0 then v" = 0 for all " (as v" is non-decreasing). But this is impossible since the buyer's
expected utility is strictly positive in equilibrium.





Using (63), the ¯rst order condition (60) is transformed into:
[(2¸ ¡ 1)' ¡ &"]"U
0 (q") = [(¸ ¡ 1)'¹ " ¡ §"]U
0 (q") + ¸'C
0 (q") ¡ #": (65)
8. Suppose there is an interval [a;b] µ [1; ¹ "] of values of " where the two inequality
constraints (56) and (57) are not binding. Then the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem implies
&" = #" = 0 for " 2 [a;b]; so the ¯rst order condition (65) simpli¯es into
(" ¡ °2)U
0 (q") = °1C





; and °2 =
(¸ ¡ 1) ¹ " ¡ §b'¡1
2¸ ¡ 1
: (67)
Since both U0 (q") and C0 (q") are strictly positive for q" strictly positive and ¸ > 1=2,
(66) can only hold for " > °2. The Implicit Function Theorem applied to (66) implies
that q" is an increasing function of " in the interval [a;b]. This property combined with
(55), (56) and U0 (q") ¸ 0 implies that z"is also increasing in the interval [a;b]:
9. Combining Statements 3, 4, 6, and 8, z" is a non-decreasing continuous function for
all " 2 [1; ¹ "]: Therefore, either (56) is never binding, or it is binding in an interval of
high values of " : [^ "; ¹ "]: In such an interval, Statement 4 implies that q" is positive and
constant: q" = ^ q for " 2 [^ "; ¹ "]:
10. Combining Statements 3, 6, 8, and 9, q" is a non-decreasing continuous function for
all " 2 [1; ¹ "]: Therefore, either (57) is never binding, or it is binding in an interval of
low values of " : [1;"0].
11. Statements 7 to 10 imply the following characterization of the optimal path of the
control variable:
q" = 0 for " 2 [1;"0] if "0 > 1;
(" ¡ °2)U
0 (q") = °1C
0 (q") for " 2 ["0; ^ "]; and (68)





; and °2 =
(¸ ¡ 1) ¹ " ¡ §^ "'¡1
2¸ ¡ 1
: (69)
The two real numbers "0 and ^ " obey: 1 · "0 · ^ " · ¹ ":
12. If ^ " = ¹ " (condition (56) is never binding), then §^ " = 0. If ^ " < ¹ ", the ¯rst order
condition (65) can be simpli¯ed using (68) and (69) for ^ "; to obtain
&"" = (2¸ ¡ 1)'(" ¡ ^ ") + §" ¡ §^ ": (70)




(2¸ ¡ 1)' +
K
"2; and (71)
§" = §^ " ¡
1
2








(2¸ ¡ 1)'^ "
2: (73)
































13. Conditional on "0 and ^ "; the set of equations (68), (69), and (74) characterize the
optimal path of the control variable fq"g
¹ "
"=1 : The optimal path fv"g
¹ "
"=1 is obtained
from (55) and (58). If interior, the optimal values of "0 and ^ " are obtained combining
the interior ¯rst order condition (66) with the constraints (57) and (56) respectively.
The values of "0 and ^ " are at a corner solution if at "0 = 1 and/or ^ " = ¹ " the constraints
(57) and (56) are satis¯ed together with the associated Kuhn-Tucker complementary
conditions.
2514. The values ¸; m; and v1 solve the following program:
max
fm;v1;¸g
J (¸;m;v1) ¡ im (76)
subject to (42).
15. Since ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (42). The ¯rst order
interior conditions of program (76) can be written as follows:
i = Jm (¸;m;v1); and (77)
Jv1 (¸;m;v1) = 0; (78)
together with the constraint (42).
16. Using the Envelope Theorem, (59), (64), and ' = (¹ " ¡ 1)
¡1, conditions (77) and (78)
are transformed into:
i = §^ " (79)
1 ¡ ¸ + §^ " = 0: (80)
Therefore,
¸ = 1 + i. (81)









1 to be the solution to U0 (q¤
1) = C0 (q¤
1):The assumptions about U and C imply
q¤
1 > 0: Substituting (82) into (68) implies that q" ¸ q1 = q¤
1 > 0: Therefore, constraint
(57) is never binding, that is "0 = 1:
18. In conclusion, the optimal path fq"g
¹ "
"=1 is characterized by (68), (75), (82), and
"0 = 1. For i su±ciently small, this solution satis¯es the assumptions made at the
head of Statement 1 because of the following reasons. Equation (81) implies ¸ > 1=2:
For i = 0; (79) implies §^ " = 0; so constraint (56) is never binding. Continuity implies
that for i su±ciently small m > z1 > ¡v1.
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